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19 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

In State v. Flynn, 8 the defendant in a bastardy case brought
habeas corpus to be discharged' from the order of commitment
founded on the testimony of the mother both as to her adultery with
defendant and non-access of her husband. The court agreed that
the mother was incompetent, under the "well settled rule," but held
that defendant had waived it by his cross-examination.
The dissenting opinion argued that the doctrine of waiver
should not be applied to this incompetency based on public policy.
In the whole field of evidence, there are few, if any, rules so universally accepted on so unsatisfactory a foundation. But apparently
legislation alone can rid the law of this absurdity.
E. W. HINTON.

-

PARTNERSHIPINSOLVENCY OF FIRM AND PARTNERS-MARSHALLING OF ASSETS-JOINT AND SEVERAL CLAIs.-[North
Caro-

lina] It is the well known general rule, in equity, that, in the distribution of the estates of insolvent partnerships and partners, the firm
creditors have a first claim upon the partnership assets, and the
individual creditors have a first claim
upon the individual assets.,
2

This is also the rule in bankruptcy.
What the foundation of this rule is has been much disputed.
It is commonly said to be a rule of general equity, designed, to some
extent, to even up the advantages of the individual creditors as compared with the partnership creditors.3 The rule obviously produces
different results from those reached by legal process. While the
partnership obligation is so far joint that, if the creditor sues one
partner only, the latter may usually plead the non-joinder of the
others in abatement, 4 yet, as soon as judgment is obtained in a suit
against all, the creditor may cause execution to be levied upon the
property of one, leaving him to get contribution from his co-partners later.5 In the case of the death of one partner before action
is brought, still other rules apply which it is not necessary to notice
here.6
These different consequences have sometimes been sought to be
explained by saying that, while partnership contractual obligations
are joint at law, they are joint and several in equity.
18.

(1923)

193 N. W. (Wis.) 651.

1. See Rodgers v. Meranda (1857) 7 Ohio St. 180; Hundlev v. Farris
(1890) 103 Mo. 78, 15 S. W. 312, 23 Am. St. R. 863, 12 L. R. A. 254; Hawkins
v. Mahoney (1898) 71 Minn. 155, 73 N. W. 720; and many others.
2. See section 5, sub. f, of the Bankruptcy Statute.
3. See Rodgers v. Meranda supra.
4. See Rice v. Shute (1770) 5 Burr. 2611, 2 Wm.BI. 695.
5. See Rice v. Shute supra. It is true that it was said by Lord Mansfield, in that case, that contracts with partners are always joint and several,
but it is clear, as has often been pointed out, that he was speaking only of the
procedural aspect, i. e., that it was so far joint that a single partner, sued
alone, could plead the non-joinder of the others in abatement, but that if he
did not so plead it, he waived it, and could be held alone. He also said, as
has often been stated, "If the action be brought against all, the plaintiff may
take out execution against any one."

COMENT ON RECENT CASES

In several states statutes have been passed purporting to make
contractual obligations incurred by several persons at the same time
joint and several. These general statutes have some times been held
to apply to partnership obligations,' and the contrary has also been
held.$ In a number of states statutes have specifically made partnership obligations joint and several. 9 In a variety of cases the creditor
has attempted to secure much the same result by obtaining, not only
-the partnership obligation, but the separate obligation of the individual partners as well. This has been attempted in several ways,
as, for example, to get the partners to sign a conceded partnership
contract in their individual names; or, more frequently, to secure
both the firm sigonature and the individual signatures. Another
form has been to have the partnership contract in terms made joint
and several. In a number of these cases it has been held that both
the joint and the several obligation of the partners may be secured,
for some purposes at least.'
In the recent case of Virginia-CarolinaChemical Co; v. Wal-

ston, 11 which seems to be largely a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had before it the question whether
the general rule in equity first referred to should apply in a state
whose statutes made partnership obligations joint and several. The
court conceded that the general rule in equity would give the individual creditors priority in the individual assets, but said "this reasoning' does not obtain with respect to general partners where, by
statute, as with us, they are made jointly and severally liable for
the debts of the partnership, for the very good reason that the force
and effect of the statute, to all intents and purposes, is to convert
the creditors of the firm into individual creditors of each member of
the partnership. Where the liability of general partners is joint
and several, and the firm assets are not sufficient to pay the firm
debts, the creditors of the partnership are entitled to have their
claims allowed in full, both as against the assets of the firm and
6. Compare Doggett v. Dill (1884) 108 Ill. 560, 48 Am. Rep. 565; Pope
v. Cole (1873) 55 N. Y. 124, 14 Am. Rep. 198.
7. See Hamilton v. Buxton (1845) 6 Ark. 24; Ryerson v. Hendrie (1867)
22 Iowa 480; Gates v. Watson (1874) 54 Mo. 585; Williants v. Rogers (1879),
77 Ky. 776.
8. See Sherburne v. Hyde (1900) 185 Ill. 580, 57 N. E. 776; Thompson
v. White (1898) 25 Colo. 226, 54 Pac. 718.
9. See the article by Professor F. M. Burdick, in Col. L. Rev. XI 101.
Professor Burdick states that twenty-three states have. in one way or another,
changed the general rule. (If I may say so, with all respect to my deceased
friend, it seems to me that part of Professor Burdick's condemnation, in
this article, of the decision in Seligman v. Friedlander,is based upon a misconception of what the court was talking about. It seems to me, from the
cases cited, that the court was speaking of one situation, and Professor Burdick of another. Both seem to me to be right, but to be discussing different
situations.)
10. See Williams Nat. Bank v. Hall (1893) 160 Mass. 171, 35 N. E.
666; Winslow v. Wallace (1888) 116 Ind. 317, 17 N. E. 923, 1 L. R. A. 179;
in re Gray (1888) 111 N. Y. 404, 18 N. E. 719, among others.
As to whether this can be done under the Bankruptcy Act, compare In
re Mosier (1901) 112 Fed. 138, with in re Davis (1922) 280 Fed. 136.
11. (1924) N. C. 123 S.E. 196.
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also as against the individual assets of a partner, to the end that
they may thus concurrently enforce the two liabilities and obtain
their ratable share of each fund."
The only case which the court cited, outside of North Carolina,
was Matter of Peck,12 where, in an action for tort, the court held
that the equity rule did not apply. It is significant, however, that
in Leggat v. Leggat13 the same court had already held that the New
York statute, making partners jointly and severally liable, had not
changed the rule prevailing in that state (contrary to the rule prevailing in many other states), that, where one partner has died, the
creditor cannot proceed against his estate until he has first exhausted
the joint estate.
Any one who feels that the equity rule is an unfair one, because it deprives the partnership creditor of one of the resources
upon which he relied in extending the credit, will make no complaint
against the conclusion reached by the North Carolina court; but
whether that is to be accepted as the general result of the now
numerous statutes making partnership contractual obligations joint
and several is not so clear.
FLOYD R. MECHEM.
12.

(1912)

Cas. 1914A 798.

206 N. Y. 55, 99 N. E. 258, 41 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1223, Ann.

13. 79 App. Div. 141, aff'd 176 N. Y. 590.

